TayoBlog

South African media has been awash with revelations that the Halal certificates on show in shops, supermarkets, restaurants and butchers may not be as trustworthy as their green colour and Arabic inscriptions declare. Islamic religious scholars who have issued them since the 1980s may not be able to guarantee their Halal status.

The furore started late in 2011 when an allegedly disgruntled ex-employee of a meat importer presented a mobile video of workers pasting Halal certificates on pork products in its warehouse. This ex-employee, allegedly working for a rival meat importer, presented the video clip to a Halal authority.

This revelation caused a minor furore within the Halal industry. It was soon discovered that the Cape Town-based Muslim Judicial Council had issued certificates to the meat importer. It was also revealed that other Halal authorization bodies had refused to issue certificates to such importers.

In spite of their differences, Muslim religious authorities tried to limit the damage. They recognized the danger to the Halal certificate that had grown in leaps and bounds. It was now not only pasted on meat and meat products, but was present on milk, face wash, sweets, chocolates, vegetable soup, and even bottled water. The certificates ensured a steady stream of revenue to the issuing bodies. More importantly, it ensured a steady flow of  Muslim consumers to retail chains, restaurants and fast-foods.

The Halal certificate heralded the coming to age of the Muslim consumer. 

In January 2011, the intrepid Deborah Petta of 3rd Degree (ETv) recognized a good controversy. She soon arrived at the staid offices of the Muslim Judicial Council of Cape Town, to see how this revelation rocked "the sacred tenets of the Islamic faith."

As usual with 3rd Degree, there was more heat than light as the cameras followed the officials of MJC refusing to be interviewed. But where there is smoke from the heat, there is a fire that cannot be ignored.

3rd Degree presented a binary image. Negligent officials of the Muslim Judicial Council were not doing their job.  In contrast, the cameras turned to the South African National Halal Authority (SANHA) as it explained its more cautious position. We got cameo shots of the pious officials of SANHA reading the Qur'an and raising their hands in prayer.

The media was doing it again: Good Muslim vs. Bad Muslim. Binary, contrasting images is the stuff that apparently made our world.

Understandable, Muslim consumers have been angry about the incident. Some have felt embarrassingly exposed. Others have felt a deep sense of betrayal in the Halal certification process. Others have gloated that they have the correct approach.

The controversy has been highlighted but its key significance obscured. The controversy reveals a deep transformation of Halal through certification.

What is a Halal certificate? At root, it is  a promissory note made to the consumer that the produce being sold is fit for Muslim religious consumption.

It takes the place of at least two personal engagements. It takes the place of a person going to a local market, and buying an animal for slaughter and consumption. The animal might even have been reared in the backyard, or a Common. It also takes the place of a person approaching a local food producer or supplier who attests by word and deed that the food is halal (literally permissible; not sacred and thus exposed to slaughter).

With modern food production, including the global distribution and flow of goods, these engagements  are placed out of the reach of most people. And this is where Halal authorities are born. The Halal certificate speaks for the self, and for an intimate relation between self and Other. 

The Halal certificate demands faith in its ability to make a decision for a Muslim, and to replace these deep engagements with self, animal and other human beings.

This personal relationship includes one's ability to decide what to consume, and where to consume. It also includes the essence of a relationship with the other.

A certificate that was invested with so much meaning had failed. The controversy exposed the hasty faith in a piece of paper that promised that one no longer needed to make a judgment, or one no longer needed to build a relationship of trust with another.

Perhaps this is what the rage and disappointed is all about in the Muslim community. Companies and Halal authorities have not yet said fully what they were doing. Like other consumer goods, their transparency is often veiled under so many layers of half-truths, enticements and assurances. 

The controversy has been useful in a way. But anger and disappointment should therefore not only be directed at the offending meat importer, or the negligent Muslim official, or the indecent media. It should be cause enough to mourn a hasty faith in a piece of paper, and the loss at a deeper individual and inter-personal relationship.

Khalid Shamis' documentary on Imam Abdullah Haron of South Africa is a masterly treatment of a man and his times. It brings out the multi-facetted dimension of the Imam, his colleagues in the Muslim Judicial Council, the Muslim community, and of course, the apartheid state.

Imam Abdullah Haron emerges in the documentary as a sensitive and courageous leader against the growing force of apartheid repression. Inspired by activist youth whom he invited to his mosque, he soon outstripped them in the services he offered to families of detainees and anti-apartheid activists. It was not long before he too became a victim, and was brutally killed in police custody in September 1969.

The producer of "The Imam and I" is the Imam's grandson, the son of his eldest daughter, Shamila, who had been sent to London to study. Khalid Shamis had heard a lot of the Imam, and felt that he was the grandson of someone important. We are grateful that he set out to find out more, and share the story with the rest of us.

The documentary consists of slices of the Imam's life and death. It includes elements of his position within the leadership of the Muslims, and its shameful silence. It also includes his innovative attempts to attract youth to the mosques, whilst raising funds for anti-apartheid activism with James Bond and other movies. Drawing on photographs and footage of the time, the documentary also reveals his great style and love for suits, fezzes, a shiny bald heard and a stylishly trimmed beard.

Most importantly, the documentary also raises some interesting questions. Some of these questions are thrown out briefly for deeper reflection. Khalid, for example, refers to the connection between London bombings and his search for knowing the truth of his 'terrorist' grandfather!

Others are more explicit, as for example, the silence of the leadership of the Muslim community when the Imam was imprisoned and then killed. Their reluctance  to raise their voices against apartheid was deafeningly portrayed! It contrasted strongly with Reverend Wrankmore's retreat and fast on a Kramat on Signal Hill!

At other times, though, the evidence presented raises questions, intended by Shamis or not. The  massive turn-out at the Imam's funeral contrasted with his isolation during imprisonment, and even more so with the fate of his wife, Galiema Sadan, and her two young children. The fate of a martyr was captured beautifully, and also painfully.

At the same time, however, the presence of thousands at the funeral by men, women and children, could not all be seen as hypocrisy. The death of a witness provided an opportunity for ordinary people to register their rejection and abhorrence of a wicked system. One may criticize them for not doing enough, but one cannot afford to miss the registration of protest.

Finally, in my view, the documentary left an impression of a complex ideology (if such a contradiction may be permitted). The Imam was inspired by an emerging ideological approach to Islam, which he hardly represented in his life and work. The footage did not even reveal this in his family and associates.

Islamism in full flow came later to Cape Town, and drew much of its strength on a greater range of books, ideas and a different style of Islam. Soon, it also drew on the Imam's fame as anti-apartheid activist in the name of Islam. This activism in the name of Islam, however, was different from Imam Haron in his family, his congregation, his fashion-statement and his activism.

In the last couple of weeks, I have had an opportunity to see a play and a film dealing with religion in Cape Town. Davis' play Mass Appeal was brilliant in its portrayal of religion between ideals and institutionalization, and Beauvois' Of Gods and Men (2010) brought home the meaning of witness  and sacrifice. It is amazing how religion flows through our secular society!

"The Imam and I" did not set out to prove a point about this or that religious value (it seems to me). It nevertheless portrayed the ordinariness of living a life of religious value. Imam Haron was serious but it did not prevent him from smiling, smart-looking, stylish and ready for some fun.

 I was privileged to observe and participate in a meeting in Essen, Germany, to commemorate and take forward the work of Prof. Nasr Hamid Abu Zeid who passed away about a year ago. Abu Zeid had made a significant contribution to the history of the interpretation of the Qur’an. However, he was not only interested in the topic for its historical value but searching for a way to read the Qur’an as a living text that spoke to the great demands of the day.

 

The meeting was attending by friends and colleagues who traveled with him on the same road. It was honoured also by the participation of Prof. Ebtehal Younes, Abu Zeid’s wife and professor at Cairo University. The meeting honoured both Abu Zeid and the path that he unlocked with his works, his friendship and his deep humanity.

 

As expected, the meeting was provocative and challenging. From the keynote presented by Prof. Shabestari (Tehran) on the first day, the focal point turned around the Qur’an. Prof. Shabestari asked what a new philosophy of language would be for a claim that the Qur’an was both revelation and Prophetic word. Prof. Barlas concluded the meeting with a plea to a return to the theology of the Qur’an, against the ‘anti-foundationalism of  Abu Zeid.’ There were also contributions that rejected any real future of the Qur’an (or religion) in Islamic Newthinking.

 

Clearly, all were agreed that a new theology or approach to the Qur’an in particular, and Islam in general, was long overdue. The participants were leaders in this search, and presented the meeting with reflections that honoured Abu Zeid and his work.

 

I would like to contribute with a reading of the substance of the meeting. In short, I think the speakers and commentators came close to admitting and arguing that we are or should be like Christians. Of course, none put in this way. But I could not help coming to this conclusion at the end of the 2-day meeting. And was further confirmed in my assessment when I looked back at my notes.

 

By way of substantiation and perhaps proof, let me explain. On the second day, Prof. Soroush opened the day with a challenge that Muslims have easily reconciled themselves to socialism, but could not do with liberalism and rights. He then challenged listeners with a question about how Muslims would produce such a theology of rights (arguing that it would be more difficult than anything that they had attempted thus far).

 

Prof. Barlas followed with her own thesis. Listening carefully to her argument, I could not help noticing how her claimed devotion to the Qur’an was nothing but a highly subjective reading thereof.She was, moreover, a witness to justice buried in the Qur’an through centuries of male witnesses. A young commentator alo praised her this "disclosure of God" in her reading of the Qur’an.

In my reading and listening, Barlas answered Soroush about where this theology of rights would come from. It was easy to find a theology of freedom in the Qur'an, but Soroush was clearly asking how Muslims would be persuaded (i.e. converted).

 

Rolling back to the first day, I recalled Prof. al-Azmeh arguing that the Qur’anic text was an aesthetic and at most a privatized religion. Prof. Sadiq Jalam al-Azm supported him by saying that Muslim Arabs have had nothing radical to offer (nothing radical enough for Islamic Newthinkig to put aside Islam and religion).

 

And my friend and colleague Prof. Esack pulled down all binaries and distinctions for a reading of the Qur'an. Beginning with the Jews and Muslims, he proceeded to question the contraries of human and non-human, the able and non-able, the living and mineral. We had arrived at the Kingdom of God, where the lion lay beside the lamb!

 

Translated, I head them saying: We are Christians! We should be Christians! We have no option but to become Christians! In fact, this declaration was relatively easy, even if it was not expressed in this way.

 

However, what the meeting struggled to find was if we were still Muslims! Everybody posed some interesting questions for the future. Those questions affirmed the history of Christianity in modern times, but only posed questions about the future of Islam. At least for Abu Zeid the music of the Qur’an was foundational, we were reminded by Prof. Younes. And Prof. Wadud was insistent that tawhid included women. Otherwise, Christianity was confirmed while Islam was put on a search.

 

When I thought about this, I was at first appalled by the implication. It reminded me once at a meeting in Brussels similar to this one when a Jesuit priest told me that only Christianity could accommodate modernity. I thought at the time that it was more likely the other way around. It also reminded me of an essay by Derrida entitled “We are all Christians.” And it reminded me of many similar reflections on how Christianity was made for modernity!

 

After the initial shock , I accepted this conclusion. I was not resigned to it, as I remembered how I have struggled with Islamic identity for some time now.

 

Once I gave up the block of identity, however, a new path opened for me. I was reminded how much Islam and Muslims (including the Prophet) had taken from the Christians. They too had become 'Christians' (okay, 'Jews' more accurately). I then also remembered how the Prophet and Muslims later took a ‘heretical turn.’ Both Jews and Christians were in turned incensed at this heresy.

 

 

Rev. Wrankmore died on 17 June at age 86, and Imam Haron's three children were all in Cape Town on the release of "The Imam and I" (produced by Khalid Shamis, grandson of Imam Haron). It was a perfect opportunity for the Western Cape Religious Leaders' Forum and the Cape Town Inter-faith Initiative to organize a commemoration service on Signal Hill (23 June 2011). Rev. Wrankmore had fasted on Signal Hill in 1971, two years after Imam Haron was killed in police detention, and demanded a judicial inquiry into his death.

About 80 people braved the wind and rain, and sat together in the small kramat on Signal Hill. The ceremony consisted of prayers, and short recollections. There were also poignant remarks by the children of both Wrankmore and Haron. It was a moving ceremony, and the cold and wind was quickly forgotten.

All present were visibly moved by the witness that both Rev. Wranmore and Imam Haron brought to the days of apartheid. The word "witness" was repeated by almost every speaker in one way of another. Witness spoke to the great depth of their lives, and what they were saying to apartheid, inter-faith relations, and to the people of Cape Town, South Africa and beyond.

It was also not forgotten that Prof. Kader Asmal, who had just died, was a great witness to the current politics of South Africa. Tributes were paid to him for breaking ranks by standing up for truth and justice. Although Asmal, in comparison with Haron and Wrankmore, was not too concerned with organized religion, he too was recognized as a witness. And with Asmal, it was clear that witnessing was not a thing of the past.

The event prompted me to reflect a bit more on the idea of witnessing. Asmal may have been different from Haron and Wrankmore in terms of religious affiliation. It is clear, though, that all three had to break ranks from their groups and 'natural' social homes. A witness seems to be someone who is not comfortable to stay in one place, and is prepared to go where her convictions takes her.

Witnessing stands at the centre of religious conviction, though. I have read that the word in English is derived from a martyr or knowledge (from wit). It recalls acts of extreme courage by early Christians in the face of danger. The witness/martyr would express his conviction, on pain of death. The witness also proclaims the real truth in this demonstration.

There is a similar sense of presence in the Qur'an, but it is not always associated with danger. A witness is a shahid and shares a linguistic affinity with words that mean 'looking' and 'seeing'.  In fact, most of the instances in the Qur'an refer to God as shahid ('God is shahid over all things').

When shahid refers to a human being, however, she demonstrates the truth. There is a verse in the Qur'an that calls upon people to becomes witnesses (shahids) like the prophets. They brought the truth and demonstrated it. The same obligation rests on the rest of humankind. 

I draw two conclusions from these. The one is the very act of witnessing implies a presence and a demonstration. Haron and then Wrankmore represent this in an inspiring way. People like Asmal continue that important tradition.

Secondly, the fact that God is the shahid (witness) turns things around. One could turn around and say that the witness or martyr is herself divine. But I think that God witnessing adds a very different dimension. It means that the real frame of witnessing has to be beyond the here and now. For religious people, it means that God is the only reality of the witnessing. For me, it means that witnessing (true witnessing) is Godlike and overcomes the politics and contradictions of the day.

 

Hamba Kahle Berni Wrankmore, Kader Asmal and Imam Abdullah Haron.

 

The regulation of Muslim marriage in the South African legal framework currently under way is not unique. We should consider the matter in the light of developments in other parts of the world, and particularly in other parts of Africa.  
The role of the state and religious authorities have come under intense scrutiny in South African media. The South African constitution very clearly enables the recognition of marriages conducted under diverse cultural traditions, which the state is obliged to facilitate in one way or another. In this particular case, Muslim religious authorities are divided between those who see the new developments as state encroachment on religion matters, and others who see the potential for a constructive partnership.
By examining similar developments in Egypt (2001), Morocco (2005) and Kenya (1998-2010), a fundamental trend seems to emerge. Since the 1990s, more inclusive approaches to politics and law have affected Muslim societies in many parts of the world. In matters of Muslim personal law, women's demand for rights is main driver of the demand for change and which has often been obscured in an ideological conflict between state and religion.
Egypt passed the so-called Khula law in 2000, which basically gave women the right to apply for a no-fault divorce without the consent of her husband. The law was a development on the 1920s when judges were obliged to look beyond one school of Islamic jurisprudence. This 2000 law took the matter one step further by permitting separation (khula) without a husband's permission. Interestingly, the main justification came from an ancient hadith in which the Prophet granted a woman separation from her husband on her request. The 2000 bill was opposed by Islamists for four years before it was finally ratified.
In 2004, Morrocco passed a Reformed Family Code after years of intense public debate. Human rights activists demanded more rights for women in Moroccan marriages, whilst opponents saw the 1956 Family Code as the centre-piece of national tradition. The latter was produced after independence from French colonial rule. At the end of a lengthy national discussion, the Moroccan King Muhammad VI eventually passed the code in 2004 .
A similar public demand for reforms in Kadhis courts was initiated in Kenya as part of a country-wide constitutional review process. Muslims in particular demanded that these Muslim courts set up by the British during the colonial period should be made more accessible, subject to review and willing to deal with new developments such as AIDS. This popular demand was diverted by some Christian groups, arguing that Kadhis courts should not be part of a national secular constitution. Eventually, a new constitution was accepted in a referendum in 2010, albeit without any substantial reforms in the Kadhis courts.
The South Africa situation, as in the other cases cited here, has brought into focus the expected tension between state and religious authorities. In Egypt, the autocratic government of Hosni Mubarak had since 1980 made numerous concessions to the Islamic religious establishment in return for their political support. In Morocco, the king deftly balanced and played off human rights activists and traditionalists. In Kenya, on the other hand, Muslims and Christians saw the Kadhis courts as symbols for their competing political positions.
In each case, ideological groups took centre stage in the public debate over a matter that affected communities and families in more fundamental ways. In each case, the source of pressure to adopt new laws to regulate Muslim marriages was obscured. Individual research has shown in these countries that social and economic conditions had changed the structure of marriages over the last few decades.
Relations within the families were drastically changing, driven mainly by dire economic conditions. Like others, Muslim marriages were increasingly supported by single-parents or  double incomes, pressurised by poverty, unemployment and extensive migration patterns.
Laws that assumed the male as the sole or main breadwinner were no longer reflecting these changes. Laws that had been formulated at independence or in the 1920s (in Egypt) could not longer address the challenges of globalization, low employment and a discourse of equal rights.
Muslim women, feeling the brunt of these pressures, were the catalysts for change. They took their problems to courts, mediation offices and informal adjudication centres run by Islamic legal experts. Driven by a desire for justice, they expected local Islamic institutions to respond to their predicaments. They did not start with the assumption that religion was an obstacle to their predicament. Rather, their conviction was and continues to be a hope and desire for justice.
In public debate, the conflict between different ideological groups tends to obscure this hope. Driven by the familiar antagonism between religion and state, and reformists and traditionalists, actual conditions in which families find themselves are forgotten.
Ideological conflicts cannot explain the similarity of these wide-ranging demands in very different countries. A monarchy, autocratic and authoritarian regimes, and an emerging democracy are too different from each other to align modernists and traditionalists, conservatives and liberals, against other.
It is more fruitful to look further down the social system to see who is pushing change and in which direction. It is, I believe, women who are expected to juggle the impossible between new social conditions, and social mores and laws that do not deliver justice.

The Ministry of Justice in South Africa has tabled the Muslim Marriages Bill for comment until 15 March 2011. Until a few weeks ago, it seemed that those opposed to the Bill had dominated the public debate with dire warnings of fire and brimstone to anyone supporting what they called the Kufr Bill. 

Supporters now seem determined to gather support for the Bill. The United Ulama Council of South Africa has organized a number of public discussions to clarify their support for the Bill, and email petitions are being collected in support. 

I support this bill and have supported this process since it began about 15 years ago. My support was based on some fundamental grounds. Most importantly, non-recognition of Muslim marriages in South Africa had fundamentally disadvantaged women and children.  And it was the obligation of the state to recognize any contract engaged in by its citizens.

A proper format needed to be found for this. The Muslim Marriage Bill is a South African legal instrument towards this process. It is not Islamic Law.

My second ground for supporting the Bill was the obvious fact that Islamic law was open to interpretation on the basis of justice and fairness. As it had been interpreted in the past to empire and culture, it could also respond to basic human rights. This would include the right of a woman to a dignified life even if that may lead to divorce. It also could respond, I thought, to the contribution that women make  to build homes, and contribute to household incomes. 

Rejection of the Bill implies that the South African government does not recognize an agreement signed between a man and a woman when they get married. Rejection means that Islamic Law does not stand up for justice. Rejection means that Islamic law has become a mark of Islamic identity and male privilege. 

 

The place of Muslim marriages in the country’s legal and parliamentary frameworks has once again landed on the rocks. This time, debate among South Africa's Muslim leaders is building up to the Ministry of Justice’s call for comment to the draft Muslim Marriage Bill (MMB) before 15 March 2011.

Positions have hardened, but the challenge remains the same. Can the South African parliament pass a law that recognizes Muslim marriages, as enunciated in the constitution? Without a law, judges are left to interpret the constitution and also Islamic law on the basis of expert witnesses.  The sticky point is how to frame Islamic law on marriage in terms of the general intention of the constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights.

Rejection of any such attempt to pass a law has come to dominate public debate among Muslims. This proposed Bill is refuted with all the religious rhetoric tcan be mustered. At the same time, this goes along with an unexpected support for a secular constitution that separates religion and state. Both are worthy of critical analysis.

Founded in Port Elizabeth around a Newspaper and now a website, the Majlis under the leadership of AS Desai has led the charge against proposed Bill. His articles and writings have spread throughout the country, challenging Muslims and their religious leaders in particular to reject this and any other proposed Bill on offer. 

The highly charged debate on Muslim radio stations, on websites and in mosque platforms, is framed in extreme theological rhetoric. Anyone supporting the bill, even in some modified form, is meddling in heresy (kufr). The Bill itself is called Kufr MMB (Heresy Muslim Marriages Bill), and those who support it are themselves implicated in heresy.

This theological framing of the debate has had its desired effect. Many religious leaders who had previously supported the bill have turned around (and some have turned back to support it too).  New groups of religious leaders are formed, and coups engineered within existing ones. The charge of heresy has had a remarkable effect.

The rhetoric has however obscured the main problem of non-recognition. Muslim women are the most obvious victims of non-recognition, particularly working-class Muslims who do not register their religious ceremonies in a civil court. In the past, when they approached the court for redress, they were turned away because Muslim marriages were “potentially polygamous” or did not conform to Christian ritual form.

The new constitution set out to change these colonial and apartheid responses. And the court record is beginning to build an alternative case history since 1994.

Not surprisingly, the defendants in these disputes have been men. They are the ones who unilaterally repudiate their wives, given them a limited amount of compensation at divorce, or take on second or third wives (often in mid-life crises). In all these cases, women receive meagre consideration or compensation for supporting homes, careers and businesses during the most difficult periods of a couple’s journey in life.

When summoned to court in these cases, men have taken recourse to fact that Muslim marriages are not recognized! The colonial and apartheid regimes harboured deep prejudices for not recognizing Muslim marriages; many Muslim men did not have to be taught how to use such prejudice to their advantage. One may say that these Muslim men have played an equally powerful role in supporting the no-recognition of Muslim marriage.

In post apartheid South Africa, Muslim men in conflict with their spouses want to naturally maintain this status quo. They do not want their wives to seek redress in court, nor in any progressive interpretation of Islamic law. The religious language of a Kufr MMB provides a perfect cover for this status quo.

All the substantive objections to the Bill reveal this male privilege. We are told in no uncertain terms that the rights of men are given by God and the Prophet Muhammad, and may not be tampered with. In some of the objections, women are regarded as emotional, deficient in intellect and wayward. Their demand for rights are framed as feminine weakness or religious infidelity.

Surprisingly, the objections raised to the proposed Bill also make a very explicit constitutional argument. They make an important point about the limits of the state in the definition and practice of religion. Echoing a venerable European tradition of the separation of religion and state, they are arguing that the proposed Muslim Marriages Bill interferes in the freedom of religion. Stressing all the values of a secular state, they want to preserve the so-called purity of Islamic law.

Clearly, the present debate does not revolve around the protection of ‘purely’ religious beliefs and practices like prayer, fasting and the like. And one has to look through the religious rhetoric to appreciate the underlying cause for concern. Not many would agree that the Bill of Rights was drafted to defend all cultural and religious practices. 

The Muslim Marriages Bill debate in South Africa deserves careful attention. On the one hand, it advances the cause of the secular constitution. More importantly, though, it points out how cultural practices can be clothed in religious rhetoric that limit the fundamental goals of the constitution. 

This was not a shopping weekend, but it is hard to miss and resist the fusion of souk and mall in this glitzy city. The Institute of Ismaili Studies invited me to speak to their alumni on how one may think of moral philosophy in a modern world. More challengingly, how might such a philosophy be taught by secondary school teachers.

It turned out to a great meeting, allowing me to reflect deeply on the kind of issues that I have been thinking about for a long time. These are preliminary thoughts shared on this blog.

Allow me a short digression. What really impressed me was the participants at this meeting. They were men and women who were involved in one or other way in education. Some of them were experienced, while others were recent graduates or still students. They were not only involved in Islamic religious education, but these issues clearly were most important for them.

Having read about the Aga Khan and seen a video documentary two years ago on how the Ismaili are facing modernity, I was surprised to come across very similar concerns among them about living in a modern world. I thought that they had overcome what many other Muslims were grappling with. They were concerned about the image of Muslims and rising tide of Islamophobia, suspicious of American foreign designs and policies on Muslims, and also about permissive values infiltrating religious  communities.

At the same time, though, they were clearly interested and willing to confront difficult questions thrown at them. I was here for 2 of the 3 days, but saw enough of a deep and critical engagement with the three of us invited to speak.

The first talk was presented by Dr. John Hull on religious education. He began with his view of education in general, and then presented a Christian theology of education for the modern world. He argued that freedom was the central distinction and pre-occupation of humanity. This quality was given to both men and women as part of the special creation of God. Created in the image of God, creativity was their destiny. And education should be directed to this goal. Moreover, he added, all religions should and were able to develop an argument for primary value of freedom. There was a place for training and even indoctrination in an educational system, but freedom was and ought to be the ultimate goal.

Prof. Liam Geron followed with an equally provocative thesis the next day. He traced the history of the Enlightenment in Europe and its antagonistic relationship with religion. Whilst championing the cause of ‘Man’ and of freedom, the Enlightenment and the liberal state were deeply committed to the suppression of religion. He also related the failed promises of the Enlightenment to rid humanity of barbarisms. In the name of science, state and the pursuit of wealth, the Enlightenment and its successors unleashed terrible wars and mass killings on humanity. Moreover, he turned to the modern liberal state as the inherited legacy of the Enlightenment. It too was committed to the elimination of religion from having any influence in society. Homing in on schooling, he showed how systematically religious education was prevented from playing a constructive role in the life of individuals and society. In the war against terror, religion was being used to serve the ends of the state.

I followed later with a talk on ethics and modern Islam. I began where Prof. Gearon did with the Enlightenment thinker Kant. However, I presented two interpretations of the Enlightenment. The first was lead by Alasdair MacIntyre who argued that there was no ethics possible in the aftermath of Kant. Having  destroyed all foundations of an ideal model of life, Kant could only bequeath a future devoid of ethical commitment. Against this judgment, however, I presented the argumen of Abd al-karim Soroush who recognize value in the ethical heritage of the Enlightenment. Turning the ethical heritage of the Middle Ages on its head, the Enlightenment provided a basis for science and development that made ethics possible. Going on from this modern ambiguous heritage, I turned to present how contemporary Muslims related to ethics. Using the example of human rights, I pointed out how identity had become a major obstacle in thinking about ethics and human rights. I then turned to the ethical heritage of Islam, and proposed that a close and critical reading might be helpful. As an example, I provided an overview of Al-Mawardi’s Adab al-Din wa ‘l-Dunya.

I hope to share my reflections on this meeting in another Blog, and perhaps a more detailed paper. My reflections will include a really interesting article that I read of Armando Salvatore on Muslims and the European public sphere.

An informative debate was held at UCT on its Admission Policy on 3 Sept 2010. The spotlight fell on how and why UCT has chosen race to address the imbalance in the student profile at the University.

UCT might be an eiite university, but the issues raised at the meeting reflected much wider concerns: From the revolution that never happened, to the skewed manner in which race was being applied, to the failure of the schooling system, to the desperate desire for schooling, and to the racial profile of class. 

The meeting was supposed to be a debate, but it turned out to have been an opportunity to present yet another list of unsolvable quandaries. All of them were important, but the speakers seemed to be throwing juggling balls or pins around at each other and towards the audience.

As I was listening and trying to keep as many of these missile in flow, I thought that there was more than one had to add. It is not something to replace the others, but crucial for the set. 

It is very clear that race, imported from the past, plays a big role  in our country. Looking back at the last 16 years though, race has acquired a new history. A new layer consisting of several strands has been added to the Racial Classification Act of apartheid. One of these strands is government legislation as well as practices. And this often receives the lion's share of attention.But there are others, as the history of race is not over in South Africa. I am thinking about racial perceptions and practices that have been changed or consolidated: that blacks have proven themselves to be incompetent, or that whites  have really benefited from BEE.There are a myriad other ways in which race is thought and practiced. The post-apartheid record does not merely consist of living in the shadow. Race is sprouting new directions that wait for our attention.

Race was taking on new meaning, adding to the apartheid legacy but quite distinct.

What does this mean for UCT's policy of admissions?

Not so sure, but we should keep juggling perhaps.

 The University of Cape Town showcased its latest Research Report (2009) at a special event on August 16, 2009. As itstarted at 5pm, Prof. Visser and later the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. MaxPrice, were keeping an eye on the time to sunset. This was no mystery, as theytold the audience that the proceedings had to be concluded by the time the Muslims could break their fasts for Ramadan. Both special Halal food and prayerfacilities were arranged for the event.

This was not unusual for South Africa, butI want to use this event to reflect on the kind public religious identitiesinscribed by food. I also want to use this opportunity to reflect on theparticular direction that a Halal industry and an accommodating public seem tobe moving Muslim identities.

These remarks by Prof. Visser and Dr. Pricedrew attention to the presence of Muslims. In particular, all who knew meexpected that I had been fasting, and also expected that I would turn to thespecial food prepared for me. I felt trapped in these expectations. I suspectthat they also thought that those Muslims present would make use of the prayerfacilities.

As I left the room at the end of themeeting, the Halal food was left untouched and unopened at the entrance of the hall. Apologies to the organizers of the event, particularly Ms. Pather.

It is amazing how consumption patterns and provision make an impact on a meeting. The intention to provide the right choice of meals is clearly noble, but the effects that flow from these are not often considered. For one, they tend to pigeon-hole South Africans in all sorts ofways.

More importantly, with respect to Islam at least, these provisions are driven by a growing Halal industry that leaves little room for individual choice. One is bombarded by pamphlets, e-mails, SMSs and Friday preachers to be on the lookout for Halal certificates, preferably those issued by the authors of these missives and not those of the competition.The Halal industry also directs well-meaning public servants to provide special food. This is the least they can do for cultural diversity.

The halal industry is driven by two powerful forces. The commercial one is probably the stronger of the two. The second, identity, should not be ignored though. The Halal sign has become a powerful symbol of Muslim identity. It announces the presence of Muslims in a neighborhood or city. Moreover, it helps Muslims to express their identity in aclear and unequivocal way.

But what is the substance of the identity?How is this identity constructed? I submit that Halal identities are constructed in a highly restrictive way. They are driven by an overwhelming asceticism; a visceral repulsiontowards all kinds of foods. And that list continues to grow as Halal authorities scan food production. Food technology becomes very important, as trace elements of insects, pork and other abominable foods are marked and identified. These days, sweets, milk, water and even toothpicks appear on these lists.

And it appears that this is how public bodies like UCT are presented with halal requirements. The presence of suppliers, of course, makes this all easy.

This particular outlook is a far cry from another approach to Halal, one that in my view is presented in the Quran. Incomparison with the one I have described, this one may be called liberalizing.

It struck me as I was reciting the Qur’an one morning. I suppose that I was drawn to this view  because I had always wondered why food regulations in the Qur’an were mostly presented as an  exception to the rule: “He has only forbidden you…” (2:173 and 16:115); “Why should ye not eat…” (6:119); “"In what has been revealed to me, I find no food prohibitions except …” (6:145). The restrictions are mentioned, but they are presented in a general framework of permissibility. To say “all is permissible except this” is very different from“only this is permissible.” Contemporary halal identities live by the latter, but the former dominate the Qur’anic syntax.

In my reading, Verse (6:145) declared some exceptions of food that should be avoided. Before this, however, there are two pages that review food taboos among the Arabs. These include human sacrifice (perhaps cannibalism?), food specially reserved for men and women, and parts of certain animals should not be consumed at all. This verse is followed by a reference to Jewish dietary law, the main point here too being that the latter is too demanding.

In this inter-textual reference, the verse(6:145) does not restrict Muslims to certain foods. It makes everything permissible except “dead meat, or blood poured forth, or the fleshof swine … or, what is impious, (meat) on which a name has been invoked.”

Permissible (halal) food is presented as a relaxation of dietary rules among Arabs and the Jews. Identity was still being construction through food, but in a completely different way from what we have become accustomed to. Identity was produced in a process dominated by a relaxation of dietary rules, not their increasing restriction.

Identity cannot be avoided in our complex society. However, we can look closer at how and to what effect they are constructed. One could have an identity defined by exclusion, or one defined by inclusion.

 

The latest Zapiro cartoon seems once again to put this question in the public domain. Muslims are getting hoarse, shouting at the top of their voices that the Prophet is beyond depiction and beyond any criticism. Cartoonists reply that there is nothing really sacrosanct that their art cannot touch, and touch up.

Zapiro’s current cartoon makes an entirely different point about Muslims and their lack of humour, but it is this particular question that receives attention in the public debate. Is the Prophet Muhammad so off-limits that the freedom of expression should be curtailed? Is he really as sacred as the freedom of expression?

This question seemed very relevant to theological debate within Islam, the significance of which has escaped most commentators. Zapiro and other cartoonists, in a completely unintended way, may be playing an important role in restoring a sense of balance in how Muslims view the Prophet Muhammad.

Muslim responses to any cartoon on the Prophet appeared to take the usual route. If we can believe the papers, there are threats against Zapiro and the M&G, and there are calls to express anger with restraint. Interestingly, Muslim responses orbit around the freedom of expression. They are hurt, angered and insulted, they say. Zapiro has gone too far! They will not sit still in the face of this provocation! All these responses orbit around expressions and representations. They hardly go beyond the right to represent something.

There is a kind childishness in Zapiro’s latest cartoon.  He has simply taken up the challenge, put up this time in Pakistan, that the Prophet Muhammad would not be depicted on computers in that country. Zapiro signed up for that challenge, as many others have done in defiance of Pakistan’s equally juvenile attempt.

It is not always childishness in the cartoon depictions of the Prophet, though. Very often, there is evident glee in tearing down sacred symbols in the name of freedom of expression. With one stroke, cartoonist claim to be underdogs against the onslaught of religion. In the process, though, the real centres of power are left untouched as the faith and belief of ordinary people everywhere are laid to waste.

Perhaps, however, we should go beyond the freedom of expression in this case.  The special nature of the Prophet is a highly significant point in Islamic theology and ritual practice. Perhaps, just perhaps, the cartoons might be an important contribution in this domain. Zapiro was clearly having fun, but his buffoonery was telling us something about the sacred and the human.

I turn your attention to the study of comparative religion, where scholars have pointed to the oscillating nature of religious biographies. Sometimes, these biographies emphasized the human nature of important religious figures; while at other times, they emphasized their special, divine qualities. There is a subtle and enduring balance and tension between these two poles.

This tension is clearly evident in the Qur’an, and in subsequent Islamic historical recollection of the Prophet. In the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad is asked to tell his contemporaries that he is “is merely a human being like you.” At other places, he is set apart from his followers: “Muhammad is not the father of any of you, but a Messenger and a Seal of the Prophets.”

When the Prophet Muhammad died, we are told in tradition that one of his eminent companions threatened to cut off the head of anyone who dared to make this claim. Another more closer companion of Muhammad reminded him that “Muhammad was merely a messenger,” and in fact mortal. Even in this anecdote, one can see a tension between an elevation of Muhammad, and his humanization.

What does Zapiro have to do with this religious artefact? In my view, quite a bit! And in order to understand this, one has to appreciate something about modern Muslim religious debates.

As in the past, the tension between the human and special nature of the Prophet is found in modern Muslim religious debates and conflicts. At the heart of an ongoing debate, also in South Africa, lies the tendency in popular Islam and Sufism to focus on the Prophet Muhammad as the foundation of human existence, the door through which salvation and mercy flows. His metaphysical existence forms the ground of all existence.

Against this trend, reformist movements emphasized the Prophet’s role as conveyor of divine truth. The emphasis is on his role as transmitter. One might see this as a de-sacralizing movement in its own right. However, this reform movement has also emphasized the absoluteness of his words and deeds. Thus, within this de-sacralization, Muslim have elevated his every word and deed to an extent never seen before in Islamic history. The general trend is that his words and deeds should not be the subject of reflection, nor open to deliberation over values. They should be approached as absolutes, carried out without any human interrogation.

In short, all movements in modern Islam emphasize the utterly divine nature of the Prophet. One turns to his person as the foundation of human and non-human reality. The other turns his personality into an absolute.

In Modern Islam, the Prophet Muhammad has lost balance between his human and extraordinary nature.  In desperation against secularization, Muslims have emphasized the extra-ordinary nature of Muhammad. The humanizing element, clearly in the Qur’an and in Islamic tradition, has been forgotten.

But all is not lost in this mad, globalizing world. Religion is no longer only the product of intense theological debate and discussion. It takes place in cafes, at dinner tables, in newspapers, but most of all on the Internet. For the humanity of the Prophet, moreover, it might just take place in a cartoon.

In spite of themselves, the cartoonists might be doing a service to Islamic theology. Their humanization of the Prophet Muhammad, particularly clear in Zapiro’s cartoon, could be taken a reminder to Muslims to re-examine their divinization of the Prophet Muhammad.

 

The Centre for Contemporary Islam at UCT organized a highly successful workshop at the Capetonian Hotel in  on May 22, 2010. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss the apparent deadlock on the proposed Bill to recognize Muslim marriage conducted only according to Muslim rites.The meeting invited a number of speakers to address the issue.Here follows my initial recollection and intepretation of the meeting.

Mr. Enver Daniels, the Chief State Law Advisor, opened the meeting with some reminiscences of the challenges that began with the interim constitution in 1994. He had worked with the former Minister of Justic and Constitutional Development, Mr. Dullah Omar, who had predicted that recognizing Muslim marriages was not going to be easy. Mr. Daniels suggested that without a Bill of Rights, many practices associated with cultural and religoius life in South Africa could be accommodated in law. But this was a thought exercise that merely emphasized the impossibility of thinking beyond the Bill of Rights, and beyond culture. Both were non-negiotable features of South African public life.

Ms. Hoodah Abrahams-Fayker from the Women's Legal Centre followed with a paper on the steady stream of women, Muslims included, who knocked on the door of the Centre for relief. Muslim women, it seems, did not find relief at the informal mediation institutions established by Muslims. The support provided by ulama was found to be particularly inadequate. The Women's Legal Centre also shed light on how it challenged the Ministry to stop procrastinating on the issue of the recognition of Muslim marriages. There was no need to have a perfect piece of legislation acceptable to all. Ammendments could emerge later on the basis of specific experiences.

One of the important questions that emerged from this second session was the cause for the long delay in passing legislation according to the Constitution. The delay could not be justified, as other contentious laws were passed since 1994.

Dr. Moosagee's sharp and focussed paper divided Muslims into three camps. Secularists wanted islamic law to conform to the constitution, while "ultra conservatives" rejected any law that would be incorporated in South Africa law. The middle ground was occupied by the majority who were prepared to work with a compromise. However, he warned that this third group opened the door to rampant secularization of Muslim marriages. Values of justice, freedom and equality would completely change Muslim marriage practices as we know them. For Moosagee, such values spelt the death-knell of the Sharian as a divinely ordained legal system.

Dr. Moosagee's paper got to the heart of the matter, but the responses were quick and decisive. Participants pointed out that the practice of the Shariah, it seems, was governed by everything other than justice, freedom and equality. Not many participants could accept that inference.

Rosiedah Shaboddien began with some fear that  everything that needed to be said was said. But her presentation helped in turning attention once again  to the lived experiences of women in society. The Islamic Shariah arrangements in South Africa had failed women. Most clerics selectively took from the tradition, and completely ignored its provisions for the rights of women. For example, South African practice discouraged women to demand that contracts stipulate limitations. Whilst the history of Islam had emphasized the contractual nature of Shariah, pointed out Shabodien, society and clergy now did not want a contract to stand in the way of love. In a contract, for example, a brideroom could accept that he will not take a second wife without the express permission of his bride, or give her the right of divorce. Shaboddien pointed out gender equality was a deep fear stalking the corridors of the Sharia as practiced in South Africa.

The final presentation by Dr. Munir Farid brought the day's discussion into sharp perspective. He homed in on the idea of Tradition in modern society. Dedicated to preserving community, looking back and upholding the values of the past, Tradition ignored the violation of rights on a day to day basis. And yet, whilst advocating preservation, tradition  could not stem the tide of social change. In fact, Farid showed how the Shariah was continually changing. Perhaps one could say that change came from the back door while the front door proclaimed that no change was permited. More directly, Farid seemed to suggest, there was much room for change within tradition.

The workshop was overflowing with ideas and perspectives. In a matter of one morning, it presented the gist of the debate raging within Muslim societies since 1994. It opened up questions that had been raised before. But more importantly, it brought these positions in conversations with each other.

Will a solution be found? It is not clear, but at least, the participants felt that the discussion could not and should not be stopped. This time, moreover, as many voices as possible should be kept in earshot of each other. More importantly, experiences with other religous traditions or of Muslims in other parts of the world should be brought into the debate. 


On May 22, we are organizing a workshop to assess developments in Muslim Family Law in South Africa since 1994. In the democratic Constitution of South Africa, state was expected to facilitate and recognize marriages conducted under religious or customary laws. And this provision included Islamic law. It is ten years since African customary law has been accommodated, but not Islamic law.

I wanted to write this Blog to reflect on talking about this issue, and thinking about it. I was interviewed on a local Muslim radio station about the forthcoming workshop. Have prepared myself to present a broad overview of the goals and questions that were to be raised at the workshop, I very soon myself presenting my personal view on the matter. I partly blame the interviewer for dragging me in this direction, but only partly.

I presented my view on the matter, but failed to give a perspective of the workshop at hand. I  am not using the Blog to present what I really wanted to say. I am using it to reflect on the difference between talking about the issue and thinking about it.

In my interview, I focussed particularly on the gap between society and religous worldview that Muslims grapple with everyday. On the one hand, there is the reality of life which includes double-income families, and even single-parent families where women in particular have to make ends meet. I was also thinking about rights-norms that have become very much part of South African society (even if South AFricans do not always live up to them). The entitlement to rights, if not always to reciprocal duties, was rooted in our everyday practices.

On the other hand, there are the demands of a religous law that seems to assume an older social world. The absolute right of the husband to unilaterally divorce his wife is one of them. It is part of a network of relations that presumes that the husband is a provider, more knowledgable, more rational and has the final say in the household. 

The social reality and the social norms (shariah) are present in Muslim societies throughout the globe. They exist side by side. They bring up all kinds of tensions and conflicts in homes and societies. They generate heated debate over what Islam says. Alternatively, they provide the framework for complaining about the bad times in which people live. They give a semblance that islam has something to say about everythng.

Whatever position a person holds, the reality of these two in some kind of tension cannot be denied. And it is this tension that seems difficult to articulate. Positions are taken and held, but the fundamental conflict between norms and society reality is avoided. And the debate on the Sharia rages on, and the fundamental conflict remains hidden  from most sides.

The Centre for Conntemporary Islam has planned a workshop on May 22 on this important topic. This follows a similar workshop organized in Kenya at Sta Paul's University (Limuru) on March 20, 2010. Both concern the role and place of aspects of the Sharia in modern states and legislation. 

A decade and a half ago, the first democratic Constitution of South Africa enabled government to enact legislation to recognize marriages conducted according to religious and cultural traditions. With respect to Muslim marriages, the 2010 Parliamentary Session might see the enactment of a law translating that provision into South African legislation.

This workshop is organized by the Centre for Contemporary Islam to pose some central questions on this important issue:

1. Why has Parliament taken so long to enact legislation?
2. What process and steps has the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Development taken to ensure the formulation of an agreeable piece of legislation?
3. How have the courts dealt with Muslim marriages since the signing of theConstitution?
4. How have Muslims resolved disputes within marriages, in and out ofcourts?
5. What positions have various Muslims (individually and organizationally) taken with respect to Muslim Family Law in the proposed legislation?
6. What critical values have emerged among human rights advocates, religious scholars (ulama) and the state on Muslim Marriages and the Constitution in South Africa?
7. How does this process compare with African Customary Marriages?
   

The CCI is bringing together scholars and activists to present short position papers on some of these questions. They will provide the basis for
an intensive discussion. The following have agreed, others may be added:

• Ms. Rosieda Shabodien - Commissioner, Commission for Gender Equality
• Dr. Allie Moosagie - Fatwa Committee of the Muslim Judicial Council
• Dr. Munir Farid - Guest Lecturer in Islamic Law at the University of Cape Town (confirmed)
• Ms. Jennifer Williams and Hoodah Abrahams-Fayker (Women's Legal Centre)

---