Islam Politics in South Africa: Suppressing the Secular
On 26 August 2008, the Islamic Peace University of South Africa (IPSA) launched its research findings on Muslim attitudes to South African politics with a panel of the most notable male political commentators within the Muslim establishment in the Western Cape. The former Premier of the Western Cape was the central attraction.
If you expected to hear anything juicy about the backroom politics of the ANC from Rasool, you would have been disappointed. But you would not have been disappointed if you wanted to listen to Muslim leadership, civil and religious, anguishing about the role of Islam in democratic South Africa.
The most significant of the presentations for me was the key result of the survey. Middle-class Muslims and their religious leaders were the most positive about South Africa’s politics. The SA constitution had clearly given Islam a respectable place since centuries of marginalization and denial.
Muslim identity was thus basking in the freedoms of South Africa’s liberal constitution and political establishment. Even foreign Muslim groups were rushing headlong to enjoy this freedom. It was an added bonus that South Africa also boasted the most beautiful cities like Cape Town, or the most functioning infrastructure if you had the money to pay for it.
But the lower one went down the class divide, said editor of the Muslim Views Farid Sayed, the more you heard the anger and despair of Muslims towards the new politics and politicians. Democratic South Africa had failed them, and failed them dismally. They wanted better schools, healthcare, food on the table (jobs) and social security. The survey clearly threw down the gauntlet to South African (Muslim) leadership.
Following this survey, all the speakers tried to propose an Islamic politics that need not be confined to the specific practices and forms of the past. The values of Sharia lay not in slavery or the denial of women’s rights, but in ultimate goals (Shaykh Seraj Hendricks). The insight (fiqh) of politics required respectful distance from the state and support for NGOs (Imam Abdul Rashied Omar). Muslims needed to recognize the threats of globalization against all traditions and all religions. Together with an alliance of the faithful, Muslims ought to draw deep from the tradition to stand up against this threat (Rasool).
The responses from the floor added to this critical engagement with the tradition. It was a discussion that apparently relativized the tradition, as one participant managed to slip in, in favour of an open-ended approach to values and principles. Against a general trend that fretted and worried about the length of a beard, the lock of hair dangling out of a tightly- woven scarf, the exact scientific calculation of the moment to break one’s fast, the panel and discussants threw open the doors to engagement, justice and humanism.
But the discussion completely ignored the survey. The responses of the majority of Muslims seemed to evade the speakers. The middle class Muslims were happy with the freedom of religion that they enjoyed. There were no critical voices about Islam in South Africa that other Muslims communities faced. The state’s support for culture and religions provided a cover for religious practices.
Elsewhere, Muslims came under microscopic observation. The local media treated Muslims with kid gloves. Other capitalist institutions treated Muslims with the respect that all customers deserved. In response, Muslim observance thrived in every corner of the country. And they seemed to feel no anguish about living in a democracy.
Poorer Muslims were unhappy with SA politicians, but they were hardly concerned about who led the prayer at the President’s inauguration, or how many minutes Islam got on national media. They called politicians to account for their promises, and found them deeply wanting. Their demands were clearly secular, and their appraisal of Muslim politics was also clearly secular.
So I wondered why the panellists were agonizing about the relationship between Islam and democracy; and Islam and values. Why did they want a religious justification for social and political values?
Why did they miss the meaning of religion among middle class Muslims who enjoyed the fruits of neo-liberalism, and enjoyed the fruits of religious freedom? And why did they miss the secular yearnings of poor Muslims, who were either comfortable with their religion they lived, or were hardly interested.
My tentative answer to this self-imposed question was that Muslim leadership in Cape Town and elsewhere has been blind to the dance of the secular and the religious that is a feature of the modern world. Committed to the past, traditionalist or reformist, they feel compelled to sing the praises of a holistic civilization.
Muslims leaders themselves enjoy the fruits of the secular if they are wealthy enough. Or they mobilize the secular aspirations of the downtrodden, in promise of a fabulous utopia called the Islamic state. The secular is part of the religious, and Muslim leadership lives on its fruits and promises.
To deny the secular is surely to miss something. To ignore the secular yearnings of a people, and feed it with religious rhetoric of any kind, begs some serious questions.
Is Neo-Conservatism Rearing its Head in South Africa?
Recent speeches by Prof. Husayn Soloman of Pretoria University have taken this speculation to new levels. He has employed the familiar argument of American neo-conservatism that targets all the Muslims as potential and actual supporters of “radical Islam”. This alarmist argument has raised the concern of Muslims, and should raise the concern of South Africans in general.
The neo-conservative agenda has been prepared to hijack the rule of law, subvert human rights conventions and present lies as facts at the highest international forums. They have done all these things under the thesis that Islam poses a threat to civilization. More ominously, the thesis argues that all Muslims are probably guilty until proven innocent. Soloman is attempting to cultivate this scenario in South Africa.
Most researchers writing on the link between Muslims in South Africa and al-Qaida operations and plans have been more circumspect. They have regularly reported on the steady flow of allegations that Muslims sympathisers and/or operatives have supported radical projects in terms of finance, safe houses and jihad camps. Bar some exceptions, they have pointed to a general tendency towards exaggeration and misinformation. The few substantiated cases have rightly been the subject of South African courts, and others have slipped away from the journalistic radar.
Since last year, though, Prof. Soloman has recycled the allegations from newspaper reports, and presented them as incontrovertible fact. His recent speech at the Israeli Institute for Counter-Terrorism shows this neo-con argument in great clarity. He omits to mention that many of the allegations have shown to be hoaxes, or even that they are being tested in courts. He taints all the Muslims in South Africa with direct sympathy for what he calls radical Islam, or political Islam.
Soloman’s argument reaches beyond the present to the very foundation of Islam in South Africa. The political exiles who were brought in chains for resisting Dutch colonialism were involved in “a very militant Islam” and focussed on “anti-slavery rebellions.” And they were no different from PAGAD’s militant campaign in the 1990s to ostensibly rid the society of drugs and gangsters.
For Solomon, like his neo-con counterparts, historical developments in the history of Muslims in this country can be simply brushed aside. There is no historical record of anti-slave rebellions by Muslims. Even if there were, no self-respecting scholar will make the claim that PAGAD and these 17th century political exiles were part of one seamless agenda. Actually, only al-Qaida members and neo-cons claim make this ludicrous claim.
Soloman then moves to another favourite: higher education institutions. Muslims attended such madrasahs in diverse countries, from Iran to arch-rival Saudi Arabia. Once in South Africa, according to Solomon, graduates from these institutions promoted a common radical ideology in mosques and schools.
As he sacrifices historical depth, Soloman also collapses the differences among Muslims over law, theology, political projects and many, many other issues. Any cursory review of Islamic institutions will reveal ethnic, racial and class divisions, theological rivalry and endless petty squabbles. Again, only al-Qaida members and the neo-cons will see a common project, each to promote their political projects.
Surely there is diversity, admits Solomon. But it turns out that the only difference recognized by Soloman is the pursuit of revolution from the top, or from below. Without a shred of evidence for South Africa, Soloman borrows this common thesis from the history of modern Islamic movements over the last quarter of the 20th century.
In an attempt to ostensibly provide substance to this revolution from below in South Africa, Soloman speculates that South African Muslims have infiltrated social movements protesting against service delivery and injustices. At the same time, they have also infiltrated gangs in the Western Cape.
Such far-fetched and wild claims do not deserve serious attention. Such claims betray a shallow understanding of the rise and fall of Islamic movements, the complicity of Muslim governments, and the particular context of the Cold War in which radicals were supported by the leading superpowers. Moreover, applying this scenario in South Africa is laughable if it were not presented by an academic at a University.
Soloman’s arguments closely follows the method of American neo-cons who presented this scenario of Islam and Muslims to the Americans. With disastrous consequences, such analysis supports a perpetual war against Islam and Muslim. It demonizes Muslims, justifies their victimization, their profiling and in too many cases their languishing in jail beyond the right to a fair trial.
The neo-con arguments successfully divert attention away from the social-political contexts of conflicts, and the historical development of Islam and Muslim societies. It is no surprise to see that Soloman has presented his “findings” at Zionist meetings in South Africa, or at anti-terrorism platforms in Israel. The neo-con arguments divert attention away from Israeli occupation, settlements and the inhuman blockades faced by Palestinians.
The neo-con argument polarizes the debate over radical ideologies among Muslims. Muslims become defensive because they correctly see an attack on Islam, and refuse to probe the real trends of radicalization within their midst. A neo-con argument does not promote an open and robust debate among citizens, about the common good for all.
Like neo-cons, Soloman ends his speeches with appeals to the South African government to pour money into increasing the surveillance of Muslims. For a start, he wants a database of Muslims religious institutions. And he wants to increase the expertise of South African security services to keep a constant watch on Muslims. Of course, Soloman is the ideal person to provide this service. At a reasonable fee, or course.
Sanctions Against Iran - War Drums Rolling On
After hearing about the new round of sanctions announced by the US (October 2007) against Iran, I decided to probe the issue beyond the one liner soundbyte of lead articles in newspapers. The latest sanctions are closely linked to the as yet unproved nuclear weapons that Iran is reportedly developing, or has developed.
The fact is there is no smoking gun as Elbaradei has repeatedly said, but reading the liberal press, you would not come to this conclusion.
In the process of trying to read beyond the headlines, I came across a very interesting interview that the BBC conducted with IAEA chief, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, in May 2007 and which has not been converted into regualr news. BBC's own report on the interview seems to sidestep the most important points made by Dr. ElBaradei. You have to be willing to listen to the interview on Radio, or pick it from the website dedicted to prevent sanctions and military intervention against Iran (http://www.campaigniran.org).
As one probes a bit deeper into the standoff between the US (and to some extent the EU) and Iran, one clearly gets the impression that the balance of the press is a misnomer. When it comes to national interests, and particularly the Middle East, the major Western Press is no different from the state-owned press that one finds in the authoritarian states in the region. Whenever a reference is made to the latter, the state's role is always mentioned without fail. But how does one mention the bias of the free press that suppresses crucial information from the public debate? I suppose one can be happy with the confinction that alternative presses will ensure that we get the information needed. But I do think that the western press has undermined its credibility on this issue. And like their approach to the Iraq war, they no longer deserve the credibility that they think they still enjoy.
In fact, one can go one step further. By slanting the news to the benefit of the soundbytes cycled by US and EU politicians, the press is clearly helping to create a mood where an air-strike against iran seems justified. And here you surely have a he burden of responsibility?
Islam and the West
The Council of Islamic Ideology, Islamabad, Pakistan has recently launched a journal called IJTIHAD. The journal is publishing a special issue on “Islam and the West” in September 2007. Khurshid Ahmad Nadim, the guest editor, requested a number of people to to express their opinion on some issues related to Islam and the West. These answers will be translated into Urdu.Since these thoughts will not appear in English, I decided to put them on the Blog.
1. Today when we speak about Islam and West, how is “West” defined? What is the point of emphasis: geography, civility, modernity, political policy?
Both the West and Islam have acquired specific meanings in modern discourse that have very little connection respectively with a geographical direction and a particular religion or belief system. The dictionary or theological meaning of these terms has very little relation with the manner in which they are used. Because of this disconnection with reality, it is very difficult to be precise. In fact, it is in my view best to avoid the use of these terms altogther. Perhaps, we can only do so by trying to deconstruct their usage. We can specify their meanings, expose their geneaology and their arbitrariness.
In our times, the term West carries the privilege and burden of modernity. It is not a geographical direction but a state of mind, associated with the most progressive advances made by human society in the last few hundred years. The West is used to contrast against something else. The West is a claim made against other perceived cultures which are identified as Eastern, African, Islamic or Oriental. Sometimes, this association between the West and progressive values is weak, and at other times it is strong.
Since 9/11, the West has meaning has become very strong. This attack and the events that followed them have been the pretext for the re-emphasis of the West as a place of positive values, democracy and a beacon of light for the rest of the world. Against the terrorists and against Islamic radicalism, the West stands for these positive values. It can protect the world against the threat of violence and destruction. The West thus stands for good against evil. Looking at the use of the West since 9/11 helps us to focus on its power and its producers. We can see how the West is a form of identity against an enemy and against an Other. The West as a source of positive value is a self-ascription that is repeated in political speeches and popular literature. This kind of identification works best if there is clearly defined Other. For many, Islam has become that Other of the West.
We must remember, however, that West has not always been associated with positive value, both by people who regard themselves as such, and by others. Shortly before the events of 9/11, globalizing trends tended to reduce the significance of the West as a distinctive culture. All cultures were open to change and diffusion. And earlier still, during the anti-colonial movements, the West was regarded by the colonized as a source of oppression and arrogance. This shows us that the West is under repeated construction and change. And more importantly, its meaning is generated by those who use it.
2. How are Islam and West dichotomized? Are there any common concerns between Islam and the West? Is the emphasis on similarities or on conflicts?
The dichotomization between Islam and West takes place through points of conflict and contestation. And one has to identify groups and individuals who wish identify themselves in relation to the Other. The second half of the 19th century was the starting-point of European imperialism when it increasingly adopted a colonial project together with a civilization mission. The prompted many Muslims, as well as people of other cultures, to define themselves in relation to this project. Many Muslims defined themselves in relation to the West. The West is a central component of Muslim politics, which can be plotted along a spectrum of Westernization to anti-Westernization. The West belongs to both extremes.
It is a prison of mutual identification that has continued in our times.
As people inhabiting the planet, there are obviously many points of common concerns and common objectives. But these common concerns are obscured by the dichotomies. Sure, there are also genuine differences as well. But the differences are magnified through these terms.
3. Is the West, as a civilization, essentially against religion?
Taking into consideration that the West is an unstable definition, no easy answer can be given. The West is not against religion as such. But it puts religion, just like everything else, under a microscope for further investigation. In modern Western culture, nothing is too sacred that cannot merit reflection and criticism. At the same time, though, some of the major revolutions in European history have come from religious inspiration and motivation. Capitalism cannot be dissociated from religion, nor can colonialism. On the positive side, the end of slavery and civil rights have also come from religious determination and conviction.
Europe, with a long history of religious institutionalization and power, is more hostile to religion, than the US. In the latter case, religion was one of the foundation stones of a new state and society.
4. Have Muslims in the West contributed to the new multi-cultural identity of Western civilization?
Muslims have contributed to multi-culturalism by their presence. They have demanded respect and equality for practicing religious rites and registering their association within these societies. It has not been an easy task, as fear and prejudice have obstructed their efforts in many of these societies and cities. Permission to build mosques in some European societies has taken many years. The democratic structures and institutions in these societies, however, have guaranteed Muslims a place. The persistence of Muslims has expanded the meaning of identity and culture in these societies. In the United States, where there exists a more accommodating attitude towards religions, Muslims have not faced these obstacles.
It should be remembered that Muslims are not only ones who have made a difference. Other cultural and religious groups, like Hindus, African Christians and Afro-Caribbeans, have also forced Western societies to reflect on their assumptions about identity and culture. These different presences have led to mixed results. Some have accommodated the new cultures, while others continue to resist multiculturalism. The events following 9/11 are used to limit this inevitable process.
Having said, though, it seems that Muslims have limited their contribution in self-centred ways. They have helped their host-societies, Western societies, to challenge their assumptions, and develop new ways of understanding groups, religions and cultures. There is very little evidence to indicate that Muslims, particularly religious leaders and institutions, have incorporated multiculturalism as part of their own ways of doing things. How do Muslims relate respectfully to Christians, atheists, Jews and Hindus in a multi-cultural environment? It seems that, for the most part, Muslims have not questioned their own assumptions of other cultures and religions. At best, they rely mainly on traditional notions of ahl al-kitab (People of the Book – Jews and Christians) to accommodate other religions and cultures. Compared to medieval notions of single monocultural regimes and modern nationalist regimes, such ideas are progressive. However, in the multicultural global village and societies that we live in, these are not adequate. The idea of a hegemonic Islamic state, as a default preferred option, has not been questioned.
5. How is the role of political Islam seen in defining the relations between Islam and the West?
Political Islam, in whatever form, sets the framework for relations between Islam and the West. Political Islam stands for Islam, and implies that politics pervades the meaning of religion in Islam. For most Westerners, religion occupies a distinctive sphere of social life and a distinctive sphere of human subjectivity. Religion may influence art, politics and society, but it remains distinct. Political Islam with its claim of an indivisible whole between religion and politics is difficult to understand from this perspective.
In the last few decades, Political Islam implies, though, there is only politics and very little religion in Islam. In this way, the moral values and spiritual foundations of Islam are being obscured. Many Westerners are simply astounded when they get to know the ethical, spiritual and artistic aspects of Muslim societies. Political Islam plays a big role in obscuring these dimensions of Islam in the public sphere. It only puts forward the idea that Islam is political, and nothing else.
6. How do you assess the role of Western media in covering Islam and its image building?
he media plays a significant role in the construction of identities. And the media by nature prefers to work with contrasting images of identities that stand out from each other. In this regard, Islam in its uniqueness and strangeness has been an attractive subject for the media. A woman with a veil, or a man with a flowing garment and long beard, stands out against accepted norms in European societies. The camera is attracted to these images. And out of these images, perceptions and stereo-types are built.
And yet, the media in the West is not as one-sided as it appears at first sight. The image that attracts the stereo-type harbours a desire as a point of contact. Out of this point of contact and this desire, conflicting sentiments are produced. Love and hate are very closely connected with each other, especially at their extremes. Whilst the overwhelming trend is negative, the Western media also produces some of the most powerfully moving and positive representations of Islam.
Moreover, one cannot forget that there are competing ideologies and interests behind the media, and most media is driven more by profits than politics. In this competition, one can easily identify media sources that are reluctant to exploit the negative image of Islam. They turn their criticism equally, sometime with greater vehemence, at conservative forces and political ideologies within Western societies. They often lead the way in exposing Muslim stereo-types in Western media. Within this democratic spirit, media does find a balance.
7. What are the fears of Muslims against the West? Are they real or imagined?
Western countries clearly have interests in Muslim countries. Primarily, these are economic interests. Muslim countries possess huge natural resources, and not only oil, which Western countries need in abundance and at the best price. Muslims also represent consumers and a market for Western countries and firms. Some Western countries also have clearly political interests, the most significant being the support of the state of Israel. The 20th century history of Jews, and particularly the Holocaust, has created a special relationship between Western countries and Israel. Not all Western countries have exactly the same relation with Israel. Germany is the most acquiescent, and the US for very different reasons too.
Given these interests, Muslims have been suspicious of Western designs and plans for the region. In recent years, moreover, with the invasion of Iraq and the continued unconditional support for Israel, Muslim attitudes towards the West have become extremely hostile and negative. In these circumstances, it seems difficult to develop a mutually constructive relationship.
Fear and suspicion, however, cannot be the foundation for the future. They do not foster a healthy and mutually beneficial relationship. Another more constructive way has to be found.
It may have to begin with a more critical look at the meaning of Western and Islamic interests as such. While broad strokes create obvious differences, careful observations seems to easily explode the arbitrary lines that have drawn between Western and Islamic. Muslim countries are diverse, and the individuals that live within them extend their networks and relations across geographical and cultural boundaries. Similarly, the West is intensely divided within itself.
Perhaps we might want to take heed from Rumi’s reflections on the relations between self and other:
The Red Mosque (Lal Masjid)
But this is not the only game in town. Many Muslims, particularly those based far from the centre of the conflict, see the saga in a completely contrary light. For them, the War against Terror has become a pretext for attacking Islam and Muslims whenever the opportunity presents itself. All over the world, it is the same story. The attack against Islam is consistent, even though it comes in different forms. Sometimes it is through Israeli occupation, sometimes through American occupation of Iraq, and sometimes even through Muslim politicians.
The two visions are mirror images of each other. And there is something wrong with their simple black and white presentations.
The weeklong Red Mosque saga can be better understood if we take a longer historical view. Founded on the idea of Islamic nationalism, Pakistanis have been at odds about what Islam might mean in a modern state. But in the 1970s matters began to change. When General Ziya al-Haq too over power in a coup in 1978, Islam as an ideology became part of state power. By this I mean that, in addition to religious groups, the military and bureaucrats also realized that there was benefit in playing Islamic politics.
In the next two decades, Pakistan foreign policy used the support for the Mujahidin in Afghanistan and Kashmir to pursue its interests. Inside the country as well, party politics were also divided on religious lines. Islam became a basis on which to gain votes, and therefore authority and power.
The Red Mosque fits directly in the power play of Islam in Pakistani politics. Through its first Imam Abdullah Ghazi, the mosque played a central role in the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s. And it has become the centre of opposition to Musharraf’s policy post 9/11. As Pakistan turned against its former allies, some of them turned against the new general and the new president.
Islam continues to be wielded as a powerful weapon for position and authority. The various divisions and factions that run through Pakistani state and society play with Islam as it suits them.
The War against Terror fits in perfectly with the religious politics in the country. The Good Muslim - Bad Muslim framework that it imposes on society provides support for both President Musharraf and his opponents. The former gets the support of Bush, while the latter can ride global Muslim sympathy.
Such politics provide no way of addressing the many problems that Pakistan faces. Religion/Islam provides a smokescreen for other interests. The veil and the beard are apt symbols for its principally mystifying contribution. It does not not really promise anything better than what the military general generals and the autocrats have promised in the past.
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